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**A Review of U.S. Army Active and  
Reserve Component Integration**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Since Desert Storm, the U.S. Army has made several efforts to refine the process of more fully integrating their Reserve Components. Among these refinements are: improved mobilization and call-up planning procedures and authorities; better incremental deployment mechanisms; and, enhanced training and readiness initiatives. This has resulted in more viable reserve components, with increased missions in Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) as well as in Operations Other than War (OOTW). Additional progress can be made, however, in the areas of force structure and doctrine as well as in the ever-present culture biases between components. Integrated units made up of elements from both the active and reserve components are necessary to make the goal of a "seamless" Army a reality by increasing efficiency and effectiveness and leveraging the strengths of all components. Management and use of integrated units requires significant changes to several automation systems. Efforts must continue on breaking down the cultural biases between the components. Habitual training relationships and shared experiences in Operations Other Than War will build the trust and confidence needed during war or national emergency.

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Error! Bookmark not defined.**Introduction.** As an active duty Army Reserve, or active guard and reserve (AGR), officer assigned to Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT)/Third U.S. Army headquarters, I deployed with the early elements into Riyadh in mid-August 1990 to establish the headquarters, and, to plan and conduct the defense of Saudi Arabia. I had no question of my duty there as one of about twenty five active duty reservists and guardsmen with ARCENT .. to perform my wartime mission with my assigned unit. I served as a ground operations officer in an ad hoc coalition cell, which had been established from the ARCENT plans and operations staff to coordinate the deployment and initial defense with Saudi Arabia's Joint Forces Command.

In late August, during a review of the major force deployment schedule, a discussion developed concerning the buildup of ARCENT headquarters in order to provide effective command and control over Army force generation in the theater. Two senior ARCENT officers stated emphatically that they did not want their Army Reserve augmentation unit activated even though they were extremely short-handed in performing ARCENT's mission. The augmentation unit consisted of approximately 285 personnel who, in time of war, were supposed to mobilize and bring ARCENT's cadre of approximately 225 active duty personnel, to operating strength. The reserve unit had existed for several years and participated in peacetime exercises and deployments to provide a surge and sustainment capability to ARCENT

headquarters. The senior officers' rationale was that they wanted active duty personnel, with more experience, to fill out the headquarters.

This lack of confidence, along with the mobilization situation during the early stages of Desert Shield which I'll discuss below, would combine to limit the effectiveness of senior reserve component units. In fact, only two of seven theater level RC units were used as planned during Desert Storm (Figure 1). The result was the utilization of ad hoc units manned by individual replacements in place of the planned reserve component units.

The current question is whether or not that lack of confidence still exists; have the circumstances which limited the effective use of high-level RC units been eliminated; and what further can be done, if anything, to integrate better the active and reserve components to form a more effective Total Army? Much of this discussion will apply generically to both Army reserve components, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and




Figure 1:



the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR); however, specific information will relate more directly to the USAR because of my personal background and experience as an Army Reserve officer. The concepts discussed, are not unique to the Army, but could be used by any of the DOD reserve components. As will be noted, some concepts are already in use in other services and might be applied to the Army.

**Operation Desert Shield Mobilization Situation.** A lot has been written about the Desert Shield / Desert Storm operation. I'll only review here the things that I think might have impacted on the AC/RC situation.

War plans in transition. War plans were shifting from a focus on Europe to the Korea and Southwest Asia (SWA) theaters. Both Europe and Korea had forward deployed active forces, while SWA had none due to the lack of access to the theater. Active Army structure at echelons-above-corps (EAC) level was aligned to the other two MRCs while ARCENT's EAC structure was primarily in the Army Reserve (Figure 1). ARCENT war plans used these reserve headquarters heavily in force generation and theater buildup and management. They were planned into the deployment flow and regularly used in exercises. No particular discomfort on the part of Army planners was evidenced, other than a general desire, in a perfect world, for the whole organization to be active duty to ease coordination and assure availability on short notice.

Since the Iron Curtain had only come down in September of the previous year, the Army's focus had not yet adjusted to priorities outside of Europe. The operational change from defending with a light to a heavy corps, freed up from the European theater, was decided during exercise Internal Look in July of 1990, just weeks before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. This decision required major changes to the existing time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL), which was already in extensive revision within Third Army and Forces Command headquarters.

Constrained airlift and combat unit priority. Once the invasion occurred, the priority for deployment flow was shifted from the planned mix of combat units and combat service support (CSS) units used to establish the theater, to one composed of almost all-combat due to the grave defensive situation. This shift in priority downplayed CSS which included substantial reserve units. The change in deployment priority was exacerbated by an initial shortage of airlift, which made deployment of theater management headquarters, mainly RC, which were planned in the flow in contiguous blocks of 200-400, impractical.

In the realm of mobilization planning at that time, large command and control units had not been broken down into small increments of 25 to 50 for mobilization and deployment, even though their mission was critical to opening a bare-based theater; i.e., no forward deployed U.S. units, and building it up. They were dealt with as all-or-nothing due to the limitations of the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), unit identification code (UIC) management and mobilization processes such as Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) accounting. Theater planning had been based around an assumption that partial or full mobilization would be declared early in the execution of a MRC and that adequate strategic lift would be available, hence the need to deal with less than complete units was not a priority.

Call-up uncertain. Even though the war plans were based on assumptions that the necessary reserve component units would be called up within 14 days after C-day,

availability was uncertain. Significant mobilization of reserve units had not been conducted since the Korean War. RC use in Vietnam was extremely limited which led to the Army's Total Force policy of dependence on RC units for support operations. This policy was intended to ensure that national will and broad public support was engaged prior to the commitment of U.S. forces in an operation. Presidential selective reserve call-up, or PSRC, was established in 1967 to allow up to 200,000 reserve troops to be called for a short period of time, but this process had never been used, creating uncertainty early in the deployment process when units were being selected and alerted.

The actual use of PSRC authority was phased, beginning with 48,000 on 22 August 1990 and rising to 115,000 on 14 November 1990<sup>1</sup>. This strength limitation again put pressure on planners to deploy less than complete units, initially.

Duration of RC support. Partial mobilization, which is what the plan was based upon as mentioned above, would allow the mobilization of 1 million persons for a year. PSRC, which was what was contemplated in August of 1990 would only provide up to 200,000 personnel. While this was an adequate amount, the duration authorized was only for 90 days with an extension of up to 90 days. This short time-frame would not allow adequate time for mobilization, training, deployment and meaningful operational time in theater, even with the extension of the second 90 days. This uncertainty over availability and duration caused a significant question of utility of the RC early in Desert Shield. It was not until 19 January 1991, just after the start of

the air campaign, that the execution of partial mobilization authority was directed, allowing access to individual replacements and units with strength totaling 360,000 reservists for up to a year.

Use of provisional units. This concern over the availability of reserve units combined with the low priority of getting any but the smallest amounts of CSS elements into the theater led to the establishment and buildup of the theater support base in an ad hoc manner. Lieutenant General John Yeosock, ARCENT commander, had a thorough knowledge of Saudi Arabia and its challenges due to his experience there as the project manager for the Saudi Arabian National Guard modernization program (PM-SANG). He deployed to the Kingdom on 4 Aug 1990 to begin establishing the critical defense and building the coalition. Knowing ARCENT's force generation capability would hinge on overcoming the huge logistical challenge of deploying a quarter of a million Army troops from the U.S. into a bare desert environment, LTG Yeosock took Major General Gus Pagonis, Forces Command J4, along to be his chief logistician. Upon arrival in theater, MG Pagonis immediately began to put together a logistics operation by requesting specific individuals be deployed to perform functional responsibilities in his provisional organization. This organization and other support elements grew as the mission grew and as airlift spaces permitted. This provisional unit, later named the 22d Support Command (SUPCOM), took the place of the 377<sup>th</sup> Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM), a USAR unit that was the designated wartime command. The initial lean logistics requirements of the


theater created a pattern of building ad hoc solutions rather than allowing the planned doctrinal flow of units.

Lack of confidence. The lack of confidence on the part of the senior ARCENT personnel described in the introduction is not a unique situation. Described variously as “arrogance”, “indifference”, and “ignorance” among the active and reserve components by Colonel David Shaver with the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute<sup>2</sup>, these attitudes on the part of both AC and RC constitute a cultural hindrance to optimal operations. Colonel Wallace Walker, a Professor at West Point, claims that a highly critical and even contemptuous regard by active forces for reserve forces has been common to not only U.S., but also British and German forces for most of this century<sup>3</sup>. While that observation may seem a bit harsh, it is built around the different approaches active and reserve component personnel bring to military duty; i.e., professional versus part-timer, installation-based versus civilian community-based, etc. I believe there is a lack of awareness and appreciation for the other’s circumstances on both sides. This attitude leads to a lack of trust which is crucial to making decisions during critical times.

The situational factors reviewed thus far all contributed in some way to the actions taken during the Desert Storm mobilization and impacted on the results achieved. Not only has the Army taken several actions to improve the mobilization mechanisms for the reserve components but also the environment has changed.

## Changes And Improvements Since Desert Storm.

Force Reductions (Figure 2). Probably the most significant environmental factor that has changed has been the drawdown of forces. Between 1989 and 1998, the Army active component will have been reduced by 35%, from 780,000 to 495,000<sup>4</sup>. This reduction is based on a shift in war plans from support of a global war in Europe, to a two, nearly simultaneous, MRC strategy as depicted in the bottom up review (BUR). Current DOD guidance may even cause additional reductions in force structure, not from a change in war plan scenarios, but because of fiscal constraints. The reductions currently programmed have included both operational forces and infrastructure units such as peacetime training, depots and logistics, base support operations, etc. Because of the need to retain hard-to-train combat capabilities in the active component, combat support (CS) and CSS units have been cut and transferred to the RC (Figure 3)<sup>4</sup>. What this means in the context of AC/RC integration is that there is no longer a robust excess capability in the active



component available to be fillers during a contingency as substitutes for RC forces.

Figure 2




Figure 3

more critical than ever to provide the necessary CS and CSS capabilities. While USAR force structure has also been cut by approximately 35% and the ARNG by approximately 20% (Figure 2), these cuts have been targeted at late deploying units which don't impact capabilities during the early stages of deployment as directly as the AC cuts do.

Fly-away cells and incremental deployment. Upon returning from Desert Storm, LTG Yeosock took the initiative to ensure that the theater level command and control structure planned for in peacetime would be available in wartime. He requested and received Department of the Army approval to add over 200 active component spaces to the critical RC headquarters shown previously in figure 1. The purpose was to create a "fly-away" cell of AC and AGR personnel who would perform planning and coordinating functions in peacetime and be available for immediate deployment in wartime. He also instructed these headquarters to configure themselves

Any unplanned active personnel or units chosen to replace planned RC units in performing missions in an MRC will reduce a capability needed elsewhere. It also means that reserve forces are




operationally so that they could flow incrementally into the theater as it matured. They did this by establishing packets of personnel and equipment with separate unit line numbers (ULNs) in the TPFDL for air and sea flow. Because they were already on active duty, the designated AC and AGR personnel could deploy early to open the theater and the unit increments could follow as the theater matures. This is a good operational solution, but it has many drawbacks from the systems standpoint. I'll discuss the systems solution under the "modularity" heading later.

Incremental mobilization and tailored force packages. Operations in Somalia, Haiti and now Bosnia have helped us to learn how to mobilize units incrementally. Additionally, by using the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up authority in these operations, we have gained experience in small scale mobilization as a means to access the units and individual skills needed from the RC. Rather than looking at mobilizing a single unit of several hundred personnel when we might only need a piece of the unit, we have learned how to establish a derivative UIC which is mobilized. We then assign the needed personnel and equipment to the derivative and deploy it separately from the parent unit which remains at home station. This process allows for tailored force capabilities, and uses only the amount of lift and other resources necessary for the mission. One result has been a less emotional level of mobilization than previously associated with "200K Call-up" or "partial mobilization. Unfortunately, as noted, this derivative process is another good operational solution, but it is still a highly laborious process because documents for

each derivative unit and its' authorized personnel and equipment must be established in the system manually. We need to approach incremental mobilization and deployment from the doctrinal level for long term success.

Doctrinal modularity. The difficulty with both operational solutions discussed above is that while they solve an immediate operational problem, they still fall short as a systemic solution. By this I mean that in the use of "fly-away" cells for incremental deployment, the AC and AGR personnel are actually on a peacetime authorization document, and invisible to the SORTS accounting process. Therefore when they arrive in country, the SORTS system does not have a document which tells it the amount and skills of personnel nor the equipment authorized. Readiness cannot be accurately reported, nor can replacement personnel and equipment be requisitioned through automated systems. For a small OOTW, these items can be tedious to manage manually; however, for the buildup to a major regional contingency, this quickly gets out of hand. Likewise, in the second case of derivative level mobilization and tailored packaging, the same need for authorization documents exists but is not available. The other problem with derivative level tailoring is that there is no mechanism to ensure that we do not become too creative in our efforts to get functions while limiting lift requirements. We could easily pull key skills, or even a team out of a unit, but not adequately provide for their security, administrative and logistics support. In Desert Storm, there were cases of ad hoc elements being used independently, without sufficient capability for twenty-four hour operations and

proper administrative and logistics support; eventually requiring reinforcement or replacement when the mission suffered. Additionally, the number of ad hoc solutions and the manual management required became a significant issue. We doctrinally design units to perform certain collective functions and give them the necessary personnel and equipment support to sustain them.



To provide the necessary modularity within doctrinal templates, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has tasked combat developers for each Army branch to develop modular unit authorization documents (Figure 4). Each functional or operational element will have its own discreet designation, listing personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations as well as standard derivative UICs. An engineer company, for instance, might have a heavy equipment section that could perform certain tasks independently. That "functional" section would be a discrete element available to be used operationally, while remaining visible to the SORTS process for readiness and sustainment.

Likewise, in the above discussion of "fly-away" cells in command and control headquarters at the theater level, the early deploying increment could have its own modular identity and each successive "slice", or cross-section, of the unit to deploy would have an identity as well. Once these modules have arrived in theater, they would again be consolidated into a single identity for efficient management by automation systems. This modularity effort offers increased flexibility and efficiency in power projection. It not only allows a just-in-time approach to deployment; but also supports the concept of split-based operations. Under this concept, only the minimum amount of in-theater management capability would be deployed, leaving the planning and support staffs back in CONUS, to provide support through modern communications lines. Since each theater build-up would be unique, a different number of increments might be deployed leaving the residual in CONUS to provide support. This modularity effort, however, is a large undertaking due to the great number of unit variations to be documented and will probably take several years to be implemented. It also requires significant changes to several automation systems in order to be executed.

While the previous discussions covered improvements in the operations, force structure and doctrine areas, there have also been improvements in RC readiness and resourcing approaches which follow.

Title XI readiness enhancement. After Desert Shield / Desert Storm, the Congress passed legislation requiring the active component to dedicate 5,000 personnel to

support enhancement of training readiness within the RC. Congress' main focus was on increasing the readiness of combat arms units, principally due to the controversy over the lack of deployment of the ARNG combat round-out brigades. Forces Command started with the "Bold Shift" initiative which grew into the Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) concept. Training relationships were established between active divisions and corps and ARNG enhanced brigades. Resident training detachments made up of AC soldiers were established to provide geographic training support to RC units. Due to their limited number, their focus was to be on training combat arms and certain combat support units.

To increase readiness in remaining RC combat support and combat service support units, the Army Reserve was designated, under the Total Army Training Study (TATS), to establish five "Exercise" Divisions. These units were an expansion of the Maneuver Training Command concept which had existed for many years. Their mission is to support CS and CSS units, both USAR and ARNG, by providing assistance in conducting collective training. This ranges from functional training of small sections and platoons to exercises for battalion and brigade level commanders and staff.

Tiered resourcing. Another readiness enhancement has been the tiered resourcing concept which has been adopted by both the USAR and ARNG. Under this concept, units are funded relative to their likelihood to deploy or, in the case of non-deploying support units, to their mobilization date. Resourcing tiers follow the priority scheme

of the Force Support Pool (FSP) and other mobilization timelines so that "first to fight" units are resourced first. This methodology is extremely important to insuring declining resources are focused in the areas of highest priority. For the USAR, this concept, initiated in 1994, has resulted in a significant increase of readiness in early deploying units.

Not all areas have seen significant improvement, however. The cultural separation between the Active, Guard and Reserve remains.

Total Force Policy is a concept, not yet a reality. The lack of confidence between components, mentioned earlier, which formed a backdrop for the Desert Storm situation, has not been aided by the competition for resources during the last six years. Beginning before Desert Shield, the Department of the Army began to make drawdown plans due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1991, the Army released a plan, internally known as the "52K" reduction, to bring down the reserve component much faster than the active component. The reserve components thought this unfair, and congress rejected it by limiting the reductions in legislation for 1992. A similar effort was made in 1992 for 1993 end-strengths and was again rejected by congress. Eventually, this tug-of-war led to the AC/RC Leaders Offsite Agreement in late 1993. This agreement established end-strengths for the three components and attempted to clarify missions between the USAR and ARNG. It also established a forum for discussing contentious issues at the senior leadership level. While this agreement has helped to add stability to the end-strength situation,

competition for funding has continued with all three components concerned that resources may unfairly be diverted from them. The drawdown also heightened finger pointing as to readiness levels and which component had the capability to perform certain missions better and at lower cost than the others. This resource competition has not helped to improve trust and confidence between the components.

As discussed earlier, the Army is getting smaller. The circumstances that allowed us to make the choices we did in Desert Shield have changed. This means, not only that we could not execute the same way we did then, but it also means that we must be more closely integrated so that we can "seamlessly" execute an operation. Since the Army is leaner overall, the components are more reliant on each other. Even though progress has been made in training and readiness, as well as in the mechanisms of mobilization and deployment, we are a long way from a seamlessly integrated Army. We must continue to seek improvements and to develop our systems as well as our attitudes to ensure we operate as an effective and efficient team.

## **Recommendations For Continued Improvements.**

Integrated units. We must get over the hurdle of having units exist in only one component. That is, that a UIC and an MTOE can only be supported in one component. The Army needs to take a hard look at the way the Air Force and Navy structures some of its fighting units. In the Air Reserve Components (ARC), up to one-third of the manning of a flying unit may be made up of active and AGR personnel with the remainder being reservists. This allows a high level of readiness, provides some peacetime operational capability, and allows an immediate deployment capability. The Navy also has a degree of component integration within their units. The Seabees, for example, have two brigade headquarters, one each on the East and West coasts. The West coast unit, supporting the Pacific, has an AC commander and RC chief of staff, with staff elements and units mixed between components. In the East coast unit, the reverse is true; with an RC commander and AC chief of staff. Within the Army, this concept could be applied to the management headquarters at echelons above corps (EAC), such as the one described below.

*The Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) example.* In both Korea and Europe, the active Army has forward deployed elements that are wartime headquarters but in peacetime they are in a reduced level of organization. Normally, units must be approximately 70% manned to be judged mission capable. In the instance of command and control headquarters like the TAACOMs, the active Army has reduced them to about 30% strength because of the theater troop ceilings and



low peacetime mission. The USAR has continental U.S. (CONUS) based augmentation units that are organized with personnel to bring the AC unit up to at least mission capable status. CONUS basing is necessary to be near recruiting pools. They train as a unit and actually deploy to support the AC unit during exercises and other surge times. In effect, the Army has one mission capable unit split between the two components. The problem is that there is more than a geographic disconnect between the two pieces. They are on separate authorization documents, and have two different UICs. This separation is mainly caused by a rigid UIC management system that cannot recognize the same unit across two components. This prevents them from sharing a parent UIC with two derivatives that show which piece is in which component. To further complicate things, the AC unit may be on an warfighting document and the USAR unit on a peacetime document. The SORTS and Structure and Manpower Accounting System (SAMAS) systems which document Army force structure cannot see a complete unit capability, so it judges the AC forward deployed unit as non-mission capable. Because the units are on separate documents, tracking and adjustments must be done manually to the USAR unit when the AC unit gets modernized equipment. If the two pieces are not kept synchronized, there will incompatibilities upon mobilization. There are two TAACOMs and one Corps Support Command as well as several smaller units in Korea and Europe with this status.

What is needed is a single parent UIC for the unit with integrated authorization documents. The AC would have an authorization document that

showed the derivative level organization they resourced and the USAR would have another document that showed their derivative level element. Each authorization document would contain the normal funding information unique to each component. A roll-up report would provide SORTS a complete readiness picture of the two pieces when combined. The derivative UIC's would also allow equipment distribution programs to identify both elements when it came time for fielding of new equipment, thereby insuring compatibility. Automation systems could be adjusted to see both derivatives and determine their resourcing levels by the component identifier. This method would result in a more seamless integration in order to effectively resource, report readiness, and operationally use the two unit parts. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations is sponsoring an initiative to go one step further and combine resourcing from all components on a single document. The challenge with this method will be the automation support required to account for and channel the resources appropriately and working out procedures for who controls the resources for shared units.

An integrated unit approach could save spaces and increase effectiveness in other type of units where certain capabilities are needed on active duty during peacetime, or for immediate deployment in a contingency operation. During Total Army Analysis 2003, conducted this past year, three additional examples arose which could have benefited by this solution.

*Example 1.* Eight U.S. Army, in Korea, had need for elements of a military police brigade headquarters in peacetime, but could not afford spaces for the total

unit within its' troop ceiling. The ARNG was resourcing a similar headquarters to perform the mission, but it was CONUS based and not available in peacetime. Both components competed to resource their needs which resulted in more capability than required with most likely a less than "seamless" interface if it becomes necessary to deploy.

*Example 2.* Similarly, Forces Command was forced to transfer a two-hundred man engineer port construction company to the USAR because of end-strength reductions. The USAR planned to keep the unit stationed at Ft. Eustis, its active duty location, so that it could be close to the key transportation elements it supported. Part of the unit was critical to early deployment because a part of it was needed to open sea ports in a contingency. After the decision had been made and resources programmed, the Department of the Army reversing their position and retained the entire company on active duty. If an integrated unit solution had been available, a platoon task force could have been retained on active duty to handle peacetime and early deployment missions, with the remainder going into the USAR. This could have resulted in an end strength savings of a hundred or more spaces for the AC. The two elements could have shared facilities and been more-or-less "seamless" in their operations.

*Example 3.* Another example involved the activation of biological detection companies, a new type of chemical unit which are required during wartime, with only a small requirement in peacetime. The chemical school at Ft. McClellan, AL. wanted an entire company, approximately one-hundred and fifty personnel resourced in the

active component to allow for peacetime and early deployment requirements. The school was also concerned that personnel readiness could not be maintained in the RC. Another company was planned to be resourced in the USAR, in close proximity to Ft. McClellan. The Department of Army approved only a platoon sized element on active duty due to extreme constraints in end strengths. The documentation will include two separate units, each being less than a whole company, with no formal ties between them other than the training relationship due to their geographic location.

While the above examples sound like small issues in the overall scheme of things, my point is that in each instance, both the active and reserve component have ended up with redundant capabilities accounting for scores of spaces while missing an opportunity to functionally integrate units. With the large reductions in end strengths, all components are counting individual spaces to get down to their authorization levels. Applying the composite unit concept to the number of high-level headquarters in Europe and Korea in addition to the functional units involved in early deployment like the ones described above could yield hundreds of spaces of savings for the AC and possibly even for the RC. As with any force structure decision, care will be needed to insure the proper mix of skills and capabilities are placed in the appropriate component and the requisite resources are applied to succeed. We will also need to review the rank structure split between the components. Career progression is necessary in both the AC and RC so an appropriate split of the senior officer and NCO positions will be required.

Implementation of integrated units will be a challenge for both AC and RC personnel due to the number of policy and procedural changes required, however.

Revised Systems for Documentation and UIC management. To effectively manage integrated units across component boundaries, will require using either a new type of single document with multiple resourcing channels, or dual documents with the same UIC. This will require significant changes to automation systems, including The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), SORTS, SAMAS and the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to make them more flexible in accounting for component personnel and related funding resources. These systems will also need to deal with modular and incremented units. While these are not simple changes, they can be done. Today's automation systems are capable of amazing things. The decades-old automation systems the Army and DOD are using will have to be replaced to meet the changing needs of the information age regardless of changes in the document system. We should insure they have the capability to support the highly tailorable and responsive forces required for tomorrow's battlefield.

And finally, the most difficult issue, that of changing the Army's culture is my last subject.

Changing the culture is one of the hardest tasks for any organization to undertake. It involves a multi-part approach over a period of time to build the teamwork and trust that is required on a modern, highly complex, fast moving battlefield. The RC will be

challenged to meet the demanding standards for such a battlefield within the limited time constraints allowed to them. However, the dedicated training relationships and insertion of more AC personnel into RC units are a good start, as are the AGR representatives of the USAR and ARNG on headquarters staffs. Both efforts help cross-fertilization between the components.

A negative influence in the process has been the low promotion selection rates for AC personnel who perform duty with the RC. In 1992, along with the establishment of dedicated training personnel, congress directed the Army to place high quality personnel into RC duty and to make that service a career enhancement, not a detraction. Despite guidance to the boards, selection rates for personnel who served in RC duty remain forty percent behind those who didn't<sup>5</sup>.

Teamwork is never easy and composite units and tighter integration will create even bigger challenges. That said, however, the Army has the capability to overcome those challenges by training the way they will fight. Continued efforts on developing realistic exercises and as well as operational experiences in OOTWs will eventually instill this team confidence in all the players. Habitual associations and integration in key areas will be needed in order for this practice to be accepted throughout the Army. The Haiti and Bosnia operations are doing some of the necessary cross-fertilizing.

Reinforcement of the partnership between Army components will require us to look at incorporating RC capabilities wherever feasible, even when a contract solution is available, such as with Brown and Root in Bosnia. Contractors are not

cheap and the same money spent on operations with RC units would buy a residual capability as well as to add to the trust and confidence between components. Increased use of RC capabilities will also require careful monitoring of reserve enlistment and retention statistics to ensure these policy changes are sustainable in the long term.

Since we really don't know what the battlefield or the Army of the future will look like, we must stay flexible and be capable of reacting quickly to changing situations. This means putting the right people with the right skills and equipment in the right place at the right time, with the right resources, regardless of component. Only then can we get the full capability of the Total Force.

## End Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> DOD Final Report to Congress, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, April 1992, Appendix H: Reserve Component Forces.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel David Shaver, *Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony*, Strategic Studies Institute, February 11, 1992, pp. 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel Wallace Earl Walker, *Comparing Army Reserve Forces: A Tale of Multiple Ironies, Conflicting Realities, and More Certain Prospects*, *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1992, p. 303.

<sup>4</sup> Structure and Manpower Accounting System (SAMAS), locked force database of November 1995 served as a major research resource for this paper.

<sup>5</sup> *Army Times*, *From active to reserve*, 27 May 1996.